Kelly talks to Gary Noesner, a legendary agent who changed the way hostage negotiation was taught and implemented at the FBI. His book is “Stalling for Time: My Life as an FBI Hostage Negotiator.” 

You really helped change the way a hostage situation was handled in the FBI  in that you didn’t always prioritize force. 

“I think we have to be smarter. We have to be wiser. We serve the public. I’ve always embraced and firmly believed in the concept that we should use no more force than is absolutely necessary. And the force that we ultimately may have to employ is based exclusively on the conduct and behavior of the perpetrator. We don’t become violent because we can or we’re able to. We do it because the actions of the person we’re dealing with leave us no choice. And I think when we live up to that standard, the public supports us and they readily see that, you know, these guys were reasonable. They tried to get this person to cooperate. They were flexible and creative and tried to understand their problems and issues and treated them politely and professionally and genuinely. But this person just wasn’t having any of it, whether it’s drugs, alcohol, enragement, whatever it might be, ergo his behavior, her behavior, usually his, forced law enforcement to take a more physical posture to resolve the situation. And I think, again, the public, think understands that.” 

What you are really teaching are communication skills. 

“30 years in the FBI, 23 as a negotiator, we saw that certainly was the case. You have to train police officers that you get more with honey than with vinegar, as they say, and you have to learn to avoid these issues to the extent you can, these confrontations. If they occur, you need to have verbal skills to be able to defuse them. You know, Kelly, it’s funny, I tell this when I speak to law enforcement audiences, any police department in the country will expend a pretty significant amount of time on firearms training and physical fitness training and how to arrest somebody and, you know, getting them to restrain and so forth. But we spend relatively little time on communication skills. And many departments spend almost zero time on that. 

You were part of the team at Waco dealing with David Koresh and the Branch Davidians. People forget that you got a bunch of people out before that thing went sideways. 

“Yeah, we got 35 people out, including 21 children. I’m quite proud of that, but no, they don’t because they remember the fire at the end. The Davidians starting the fire in  response to the FBI putting tear gas in. But what really was the big problem at Waco and almost everybody knows a little something about Waco and it was the FBI had in 1993 when this happened, really departed from our longstanding philosophy. People say, well, you just didn’t know who you were dealing with the cult members. No, we had a very good strategy, and we understood him pretty well. It’s the fact that on scene managers for the FBI, while they were supportive of the negotiations, they were also supportive at the same time of very aggressive external tactical pressure, which as a negotiator, is what we call the paradox of power. The harder you push, the more likely you are to get resistance. And it sends a contrary message to that which the negotiators are sending. So while unintentional, we ended up sending very much mixed signals to David Koresh.”